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11 Introduction
Recent theoretical and empirical studies on comparative constitutions have deep-
ened our understanding of how political institutions shape economic policies. Models
by Persson and Tabellini (1999), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), and Milesi-Ferretti et al.
(2002), for example, compared how diﬀerent electoral rules lead to diﬀerent ﬁscal poli-
cies such as the size of general public goods, targeted transfers, local public goods,
and corruption. Pagano and Volpin (2006) investigated how electoral rules shape
government regulations on corporate governance. There also have been a few studies
investigating the economic eﬀects of legislative institutions. Persson and Tabellini
(2000) compared the consequences of presidential versus parliamentary constitutions
on ﬁscal policy. More recently, Battagilini and Coate (2005, 2006) modeled the re-
lationship between legislative bargaining, public investment and debt. Finally, Fong
(2006) and Baron, Diermeier, and Fong (2007) showed how coalition formation and
voting under proportional representation can lead to policy ineﬃciency. This last
approach combined both legislative and electoral institutions into a single, integrated
model.
These theoretical advances have been accompanied by related empirical investiga-
tios. In some cases the purpose was to test some of the theoretical predictions of the
models, in others to establish new relationships. Persson and Tabellini (2001, 2003,
2004), for example, created a comprehensive data set on political institutions and
then use the data to empirically investigate how constitutional arrangements shape
ﬁscal policies.
Most of the existing studies, however, are based on static models or focus on static
policy issues like the sizes of total government spending, welfare expenditures, or the
level of waste and corruption. This is in marked contrast to the earlier generations of
political economy models with their emphasis dynamic phenomena such as political
business cycles (Rogoﬀ 1990, Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 1997), public debt (Alesina
and Drazen 1991, Alesina and Tabellini 1990, Persson and Svensson 1989, and Aghion
and Bolton 1990), dynamics of welfare programs. (Hassler et al 2003, 2005 and
22006), public investment (Azzimonti 2006), and models of growth (Alesina and Rodrik
1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994 and Krusell 1996). However, these earlier models
relied on very simpliﬁed models of political decision-making, such as the median
voter theorem, that were unable to capture constitutional diﬀerences. To model
constitutional diﬀerence an institutionalist approach is necessary.
This state of aﬀairs leaves an important gap in our understanding of the relation-
ship between political institutions and economic policy. It seems that we can either
focus on institutional accounts of economic policy making or on dynamic policy mod-
els, but not both.1 This state of aﬀairs is particularly lamentable as recent work
by e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2001, 2003, 2004) provided some empirical evidence
of the constitutional eﬀects on political business cycles, ﬁscal deﬁcits as well as the
responsiveness of government to business cycles. The main diﬃculty is the absence of
suitable political economy frameworks, i.e. institutionally rich models with changing
economic state variables. Existing legislative decision-making approaches run into
technical diﬃculties once we enrich the choice space to include dynamic economic
policy. Continuing policies in multiperiod models usually generate discontinuity and
non-concavity of equilibrium value functions and policy rules that make the charac-
terization of an equilibrium a challenging task (Baron and Herron 2003, Kalandrakis
2003, Baron, Diermeier and Fong 2007, Duggan and Kalandrakis 2007).
In this paper, we propose a new legislative decision-making framework to address
these short-comings. The core legislative bargaining model is characterized by two
key features: (1) A policy, once enacted, is in eﬀect until a new law is made. (2) Any
legislator with agenda-setting power is allowed to make a new policy proposal at any
time and as frequently as possible. The ﬁrst feature is reminiscent of Bernheim et al’s
(2006) concept of an evolving default policy. The idea is that during the a legislative
period (i.e. before a new election must be held) policies can always be reconsidered.2
The second feature distinguishes our model from all others in the literature. While
most dynamic legislative bargaining models are extremely diﬃcult to solve, our model
1A recent exceptions is the work by Battaglini and Coate on public debt (2006, 2007).
2The relationship with Bernheim et al. (2006) is discussed iin more detail below.
3is tractable and exhibits continuous value functions, a rarity in models of collective
choice. The model is extremely tractable and at the same time it yields predictions
that not only seem plausible but appear to be consistent with recent empirical studies
on the value of proposal power (Knight 2005).
These properties allow us to apply the model to an environment of dynamic policy
choice. We ﬁrst analyze a model of distributive politics in the tradition of Baron and
Herron (2003) and Kalandrakis (2003). The model consists of a sequence of legislative
periods. In each period legislators have to agree on a new distribution of beneﬁts.
The equilibrium choices of each legislator in each period, however, may depend on
a status quo policy which is in turn determined by the policy choice in the previous
period.
In this paper we focus on a particular structure of agenda-setting that is typical of
parliamentary democracies. Comparative scholars have long observed that compared
to presidential systems the constitutional features of parliamentary systems lead to
high levels of agenda control for the executive, i.e. the cabinet (Doering 1995). In
many cases, that power is concentrated within the prime minister. We capture this
feature formally by considering a single, persistent agenda-setter during a given leg-
islative period. Surprisingly, this framework does not necessarly lead to extreme
proposal power, but constrains the agenda setter.
Speciﬁcally, we show that in the context of distributive policies, legislators have
indirect preferences over distributions of beneﬁts. That is, each legislator cares not
only about his own allocation of beneﬁts but also about the allocation to other legisla-
tors. This hold not because of altruistic preferences, but because current distributions
aﬀect each legislator’s bargaining power in the future. As a consequence, in equilib-
rium, the legislators not included in the winning coalition are not fully expropriated,
and the value of agenda-setting can be signiﬁcantly smaller than what is predicted in
other proposer models such as Baron and Ferejohn (1989) or Bernheim et al. (2006).
This result of constrained proposal power is consistent with some recent empirical
ﬁndings (e.g. Knight 2005).
We then apply our modeling modeling framework to a fully dynamic setting to
4capture richer political economy environments including the source of policy inertia,
especially in the context of entitlement programs and the so-called "ratchet eﬀect" of
government spending, i.e. the observation that in some countries government spening
increasese during recessions, but does not decrease during booms, leading to a step-
wise increase in overall public spending. Persson and Tabellini (2004) show that
the ratchet eﬀect is only observed in parliamentary democracies with proportional
representation, yet absent in other political systems.
Our point of departure is the Baron and Ferejohn model (1989). They analyzed
how legislators bargain over a pie with majority rule and ﬁnd a unique stationary
equilibrium where only a bare majority of legislators receive positive shares of the pie,
while the agenda setter captures a disproportionate share. The seminal paper was
recently tested by Knight (2005) using US data on the distribution of transportation
projects. The evidence supports the key qualitative prediction that proposal power is
valuable, but more constrained that predicted by the model. In our model, we show
that the possibility to reconsider a policy issue substantially weakens the proposal
power for an agenda setter, even if he has the sole authority to make policy proposals
throughout the whole legislative session. In existing legislative bargaining models a
s i n g l ep r o p o s e rw o u l da l w a y sb ea b l et oc a p t u r et h ee n t i r ep i e .H o w e v e r ,t h i si sn o t
the case in our model, as legislators, out of fear that the agenda setter will use his
agenda setting power to exploit legislators with low reservation values in the future,
do not approve any policy that substantially lower the reservation values of others.
The paper belongs to the literature of dynamic legislative bargaining with a mov-
ing status quo where intertemporal tradeoﬀ between current legislative and future
status quo may lead to complex patterns of policy dynamics. With one-dimensional
policy space and single-peaked preferences, Baron (1996) showed that, in the long run,
the policy will converge to the alternative preferred by the median voter. Baron and
Herron (2003) and Fong (2004) study the game in a multidimensional policy space. In
models of a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation, Fong (2006)
shows that an incumbent coalition government strategically manipulates to lower the
bargaining position of the outside parties in order to create cheap coalition partners
5in the future. The incentive leads to more non-central policy outcomes and ineﬃ-
ciency. Baron et al (2007) show that with strategic voters the problem of ineﬃciency
is worsened, since a more extreme status quo favors the incumbent parties in future
elections.
Kalandrakis (2004) analyzes an inﬁnitely repeated Baron-Ferejohn legislative bar-
gaining where three players with linear utility divide a dollar in each period. The
Markov perfect equilibrium in his model has the charateristc that irrespective of the
discount factor or the initial division of the dollar, the proposer eventually extracts
the whole dollar in all periods. In contrast, in the dynamic version of our model, full
expropriation by the agenda setter rarely occurs. The distribution is more egalitarian.
Bernheim et al (2006) examines legislative policy making in institutions with real-
time agenda setting and evolving default. Assuming ﬁnite rounds of proposal-making
and voting within a pork barrel model of redistributive politics, the last proposer is
able to pass his favorite policy under relatively weak conditions. As a consequence,
the ﬁnal policy outcome is highly unequal, and the last proposer is able to obtain his
ideal policy. As the authors point out in the concluding section, it is natural to wonder
w h e t h e rp a r t i c u l a rp r o c e d u r e se ﬀectively promote a more egalitarian distribution of
political power. Our model maintains the idea of an evolving default policy, but
assumes an agenda setter with persistent power throughout the legislative session
and no ex ante known last round of negotiation.
This paper is also linked to a recently emerging literature on the role of lack of
commitment in policy making. While it is commonly accepted that lack of commit-
ment by the policy maker is a source of ineﬃciency, our model shows that lack of
commitment by the agenda-setter who holds power for a certain amount of time in
fact leads to more egalitarian divisions. If we were to introduce some concavity into
the legislators’ payoﬀ functions, this would imply more eﬃcient policy outcomes.
62 The Model
2.1 The Setup
The political system is characterized by a legislature with three members, indexed by
l ∈ {1,2,3}. The legislature must collectively decide on how to divide a total beneﬁt
of G ∈ N units for each period t =1 ,2,...,T. W ec o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r eT is either
potentially large but ﬁnite and where T is (countably) inﬁnite. A feasible policy in
period t is therefore a triple xt =( x1,t,x 2,t,x 3,t) with xl,t ∈ Z+ for all l ∈ {1,2,3} and
P3
l=1 xl,t ≤ G. Denote the (time-invariant) policy space by ∆(G). The assumption
of a discrete policy is made for technical convenience. The units can be as small as
necessary, e.g. one cent.
Every legislator derives utility from the beneﬁth er e c e i v e sa c c o r d i n gt ot h ep o l i c y .
Given a sequence of policy, {xt}
T
t=1 , the expected and discounted sum of utility of
legislator l is given by
T P
t=1
β
t−1 (1 − β)xl,t,
where β is a common discount factor. The multiplication by (1 − β) is a normalization
that yields simpler algebra in the inﬁnite horizon model. The per period utility
function is assumed to be linear since we do want to consider dynamic risk sharing
in this paper.
In every period t ∈ {1,...,T}, all legislators meet in a legislative session and one of
them at ∈ {1,2,3} is randomly selected to be the sole agenda setter. There is only one
session in a period so we use the terms "period t" and "session t" interchangably. The
agenda setter is conferred the solde power to make proposals from the policy space
at any time throughout the legislative session. The political process in a session is
modeled as the dynamic bargaining institution of Diermeier and Fong (2007) and its
detailed description is relegated to the next paragraph. If at the end of the session
a new policy x0 has been adopted, it is implemented and xt = x0. If the agenda
setter waives his proposal power or no agreement on a new policy is reached before
the session ends, the status quo policy remains in place and xt = xt−1. We assume an
arbitrary initial status quo x0 ∈ ∆(G), which is the prevailing policy prior to period
71, the beginning of the model.
The assumption of a moving status quo captures the idea that, once enacted, a
policy is in eﬀect until it is reformed through the political process. Intuitively, this
means that our model applies to continuing policies as in Baron (1996). Exampes
are entitlement programs that stay in place until they are changed by the legislature.
Examples include social security and welfare programs, but also subsidies for certain
industries. In many cases,e.g. the U.S. Social Security Act of 1935, beneﬁciaries
can sue the government if beneﬁts are with-held. The U.S. Congressional Budget
Oﬃce reported that in 1996 more than 55% of all Federal expenditures (excluding
interest payments) were dedicated to entitlement programs which amounted to 10.3%
of U.S. GDP (Baron 1996; p. 317). Other examples are various forms of regulation
if they have distributive consequences. That is, regulatory policies usually impose
(net) beneﬁts on some economic actors and (net) costs on others. Examples include
regulatory policies in the areas of trade, work-place safety, zoning, or price controls.
Legislative bargaining in a session proceeds in potentially multiple rounds of pro-
posal making and voting. The number of rounds depends on both exogenous factors
that may randomly terminate the session and the decision by the agenda setter. Ini-
tially, in each session t there is a default policy dt,0 ∈ ∆(G). A "default" is the
policy that will be implemented if no new policy proposal is passed subsequently in
the same session. To make it consistent with the assumption of a moving status quo
we assume that in each session the initial default is the policy implemented in the
previous session, i.e. dt,0 = xt−1; i.e., Denote the prevailing default in round r by
dt,r−1. In each round r, the agenda setter can choose to make a new policy proposal
x0
t,r or to pass. To simplify the mathematical formulation, a "pass" is modeled as a
proposal identical to the prevailing default; i.e., x0
t,r = dt,r−1. Once a proposal (diﬀer-
ent from the default) is made, it is voted on against the default. Voting is by simple
majority rule. If a new proposal passes it becomes the default in the next round,
i.e., dt,r = x0
t,r. Otherwise the original default remains, i.e., dt,r = dt,r−1. Collective
decision-making then continues in the same fashion conditional on the continuation
of the session. The default evolves as legislation in a session progresses. The default
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Figure 1: Flow chart: the political process in round r of session t.
policy that survives till the end of the session is the policy outcome in that period
and the status quo for the next session
There are two ways to terminate a legislative session. First, at the end of each
round of negotiation, the session may end exogenously with probability (1 − δ), where
δ ∈ [0,1]. In other words, conditional on any round of negotiation, with probability
δ a session continues and the agenda setter gets a chance to revisit the same policy
issue and make a new proposal to replace the bill that has been passed. Throughout
the paper, we assume that a session may exogenously end only with a negligible
probability and only characterize an equilibrium with δ suﬃciently close to 1. Second,
the session ends endogenously if the ongoing default is such that the agenda setter no
longer wants to propose any new policy to defeat it.
The political process in round r of session t is summarized in Figure 1.
Note that in the existing dynamic bargaining literature status quo and default
policy (e.g. Baron 1996, Kalandrakis 2004, Fong 2006, Baron, Diermeier and Fong
2007, and Duggan and Kalandrakis 2007). However, this is not the case in our model.
The status quo for a session is the initial policy at the beginning of that session. In
the ﬁrst session it is given exogenously. But if a new policy is passed in any session
9that policy becomes the next session’s status quo. In contrast, we refer to a default
as the policy to be implemented at the end of the session if no new bill is passed on
the same policy issue in the remainder of that same session.
The assumption of an evolving default is similar to the approach proposed by
Bernheim et al (2006). That is, the passage of a bill does not prevent the legislature
from revisiting the issue at a later date; rather, it changes the default for subsequent
deliberations. Bernheim et al. assumed an exogenously ﬁxed, commonly known
number of bargaining rounds. In our model, however, there is not a well-deﬁned last
round. Rather, the number of actual bargaining rounds is endogenously determined
in equilibrium.
Our set-up is closely related to Kalandrakis (2004) but with only one critical
diﬀerence. Kalandrakis (2004) assumes that an agenda setter is restricted to make a
policy proposal only once in every legislative session, whereas here we assume that
an agenda setter could potentially make proposals more than once in one session.
Conceptually, the passage of a bill does not prevent the legislature from revisiting the
same policy issue before the bill becomes law. Like Kalandrakis, we characterize a
stationary equilibrium and a comparison of equilibrium policy outcomes shows how
the possibility of reconsideration substantially changes the nature of enacted policies
as well as the dynamics of policy choice. Speciﬁcally, Kalandrakis (2004) constructs
an equilibrium in which, in the long run, the agenda setter takes all the beneﬁt,
whereas such policy dynamics do not occur in our model for almost all initial status
quo policies.
2.2 Equilibrium Deﬁnition
Consider an arbitrary period t ∈ {1,...,T}. No matter in which round of negotiation,
the only payoﬀ relevant state variable is the prevailing default dt,r−1. If no new bill is
passed in this session, the default dt is the policy outcome in period t and becomes
the initial default in session t +1 . Since the probability that a session exogenously
ends is the same, the legislators face an identical dynamic choice problem in legislative
bargaining rounds r and r0 6= r if the default policies in the two rounds are the same,
10i.e., dt,r−1 = dt,r0−1. Therefore, we restrict analysis to cases in which the legislators
condition their strategies only on the prevailing default. In other words, we assume
stationarity within a legislative session.
For any legislator l ∈ {1,2,3}, let Ul (xt,a t,t) be the legislator’s expected and
discounted sum of utility evaluated in period t with agenda setter at, if a policy xt is
passed in the current round of negotiation. We refer to
Ul : ∆(G) ×{ 1,2,3}×{ 1,...,T} → R
as a dynamic payoﬀ function. Given this deﬁnition, with prevailing default dt,
Ul (dt,a t,t) is the reservation value of legislator l, which is his expected and dis-
counted sum of utility if policy dt remains to be default in the subsequent round.
We make two behavioral assumptions regarding proposal making and voting.
First, an agenda setter proposes a new policy (diﬀerent from the prevailing default)
if doing so makes him strictly better oﬀ. Otherwise, he passes or, equivalently, he
proposes the default policy. This assumption can be justiﬁed by an inﬁnitesimal cost
of proposal making. Given stationarity within a legislative session, once an agenda
setter passes a round in some session t, he would pass all potential subsequent rounds
and therefore this session ends. Second, a legislator votes against a policy proposal
if and only if passage of the bill makes him strictly worse oﬀ.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
ac a s ei nw h i c hal e g i s l a t o rh a st oo v e r c o m ea ni n ﬁnitesimal cost in order to vote
against the agenda setter. Since a legislator as voter simply compares a proposal and
the default policy, it is not necessary to specify voting strategies explicitly.
For any agenda setter a ∈ {1,2,3} in an arbitrary round of negotiation in period
t with default dt, let g(dt,a t,t) ∈ ∆(G) be his optimal proposal. This is the policy
that maximizes the his dynamic payoﬀ Ua (·,a t,t) subject to the constraint that at
least one other legislator is weakly better oﬀ if this policy becomes a new default. In
other words, g(dt,a t,t) solves
max
x0∈∆(G)
Ua (x0,a t,t)
s.t. Ui (x0,a t,t) ≥ Ui (dt,a t,t) for some i 6= a.
(1)
11By the two behavioral assumptions in the previous paragraph, majority voting is
modeled by an incentive compatibility constraint in the maximization problem. An
agenda setter would never make any proposal that is destined to be rejected by
majority voting. Therefore, any proposal, if made, would satisfy at least one of the
other legislators at his reservation value. Note that the prevailing default dt always
satisﬁes the incentive compatibility constraint. If the default policy is such that
an agenda setter cannot pass any proposal that leaves him a strictly higher dynamic
payoﬀ than his reservation value, he proposes, and of course, passes the default policy.
In this case, the default policy solves the constrained maximization problem.
In the rest of the paper we call the function
g : ∆(G) ×{ 1,2,3}×{ 1,...,T} → ∆(G)
a (pure-strategy) policy rule. Diermeier and Fong (2007) show that in one-session
dynamic legislative bargaining with a discrete distributive policy space, only pure
strategies are played in the unique stationary Markov perfect equilibrium. Therefore,
in this paper we restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria.
For any legislator l ∈ {1,2,3}, let Vl (xt−1,t) be his expected and discounted sum
of utility evaluated in the beginning of period t +1(or at the end of period t)w i t h
a status quo xt−1 before an agenda setter is randomly selected. We call
Vl : ∆(G) ×{ 1,...,T} → R
a continuation value function. The dynamic payoﬀ function and the continuation
value function can be jointly and recursively calculated once the policy rule is known.
In particular, for any xt−1 ∈ ∆(G),
Vl (xt−1,t)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
P
at∈{1,2,3}
1
3Ul (gl (xt−1,a t,t),a t,t+1 ), if t ∈ {1,...,T− 1},
0, if t = T.
(2)
The continuation value at the end of period T is obviously zero. For any t ∈ {1,...,T},
any at ∈ {1,2,3} and any xt ∈ ∆(G),
Ul (xt,a t,t)=( 1− δ)[(1− β)xt,l + βVl (xt,t)] + δUl (g(xt,a t,t),a t,t). (3)
We are ready to summarize the equilibrium deﬁnition.
12Deﬁnition 1 A subgame perfect equilibrium (stationary in each session) of this po-
litical system with a ﬁnite horizon is a set of dynamic payoﬀ functions (U1,U 2,U 3),
a set of continuation value functions (V1,V 2,V 3), and a policy rule g, such that:
1. Given (U1,U 2,U 3), g solves maximization problem (1).
2. Given g and Vl, for all l ∈ {1,2,3},U l solves the functional equation (3).
3. Given g and (U1,U 2,U 3), for all l ∈ {1,2,3},V l is deﬁned by equation (2).
For the purpose of this paper, we only characterize an equilibrium for δ suﬃciently
close to 1.
3A n a l y s i s
We solve the model by backward induction. However, deriving the dynamic payoﬀ
functions is a nontrivial task; it involves solving a ﬁxed-point problem, which results
from stationarity within a session.
3.1 The Last Period
The last period is isomorphic to the one-session model of Diermeier and Fong (2007).
The proposition below restates their results relevant for this paper, followed by a
discussion of the main implications.
Proposition 1 For any δ suﬃciently close to 1, there exists a unique legislative equi-
librium, in which for any x ∈ ∆(G) and any a,l ∈ {1,2,3},
gl (x,a,T)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
min
i6=a
xi, if l 6= a,
G − 2min
i6=a
xi, if l = a.
In equilibrium and for any initial default policy xT−1 in period T such that g(xT−1,a) 6=
xT−1, the agenda setter makes a policy proposal g(xT−1,a) only in the ﬁrst round and
this proposal is passed.
13The result has some immediate implications.
First, although the agenda setter is allowed to make a policy proposal at any time
and as frequently as possible during the legislative session, in equilibrium, there is only
one round of proposal making and voting. In an environment without uncertainty,
t h ec o l l e c t i v ed e c i s i o ni sm a d eo n c ea n df o ra l lw i t h o u ta n yf u r t h e rm o d i ﬁcations.
Second, although it looks as if the legislators played a one-shot legislative bargain-
ing game with closed rule, the possibility of reconsideration changes the nature of the
game and makes the equilibrium policy outcome substantially diﬀerent from what the
equilibrium outcome of a static game. Consider the following numerical example.
EXAMPLE 3.1. Assume that G =6 0 , the initial default policy xT−1 =( 3 0 ,20,10),
and aT =1is the agenda setter. In a static model with closed rule the policy out-
come would be (50,0,10). Legislator 3 is most disadvantaged by the default policy,
and therefore becomes the cheapest coalition partner for the agenda setter. Excluded
from the coalition, legislator 2 is fully expropriated since her vote is not needed at
all to pass the proposal. The agenda setter leaves legislator 3 just enough beneﬁtt o
break even and takes the rest of the pie.
In our setup, however, the agenda setter could never pass the policy (50,0,10).
To see why, consider counter-factually, what would happen if legislator 3 approved
the proposal. With probability 1−δ the legislators would not have be able to revisit
the policy issue and therefore (50,0,10) would be the ﬁnal policy outcome. With
probability δ, however, the agenda setter would be able to propose a new policy
(60,0,0), which would be accepted by the fully expropriated legislator 2. This implies
that by accepting the policy (50,0,10), legislator 3 becomes vulnerable. Foreseeing
such an adverse consequence, legislator 3 will always vote against the proposal of
(50,0,10) even though according to this proposal he does not lose any beneﬁtr i g h t
away. By similar arguments, we can conclude that legislator 3 w i l ln o ta c c e p ta n y
new policy where legislator 2 receives strictly less beneﬁt than legislator 3.T h e r e f o r e ,
legislator 1 as agenda setter can guarantee himself at most 40 and pass the policy
of (40,10,10). Notice that the possibility to reconsider policies limits agenda control
even in the case where there is a sole agenda setter. This in marked contrast not
14only to the Baron-Ferejohn-type models, but also to agenda control models with
sincere voting (McKelvey 1976), where an agenda could achieve any point in the
policy space, or sophisticated voting (Banks 1980, Shepsle and Weingast 1980) where
the set of attainable policies is only limited to the Banks set or the Uncovered Set,
respectively.
Note also that our result is very diﬀerent from the result obtained by Bernheim et
al. where the last proposer can capture all or almost all of the beneﬁts. The "power
of the last word" disappears once we allow for possible ongoing consideration of policy
proposals.
Third, the legislators have indirect preferences over the distribution of beneﬁts,
although the legislators derive utilities only from the beneﬁts they receive. In Example
3.1, legislator 3 strictly prefers (40,10,10) to (50,0,10) even though both policies leave
him 10 units of beneﬁt. Distribution of beneﬁts matters, because through the evolving
default, it aﬀects distribution of bargaining power in the rest of the legislative session.
Fourth, except for the agenda setter, all legislators have preferences towards more
egalitarian distribution of beneﬁts. In particular, a legislator without the agenda
setting power does not want other legislators to be fully expropriated by the agenda
setter. However, this demand for "fairer allocations" result from self-interested legis-
lators who want to improve their long-term bargaining position.I td o e sn o td e p e n d
on primitive preference for fair allocations. In a model of decision-making over leg-
islative procedures this insight may have implications for the existence of minority
rights and beneﬁts in legislatures.
Five, as a consequence, the agenda setter has limited ability to expropriate the
legislator excluded from his winning coalition. Speciﬁcally, the value of proposal
power in our model is in general smaller that what is implied by a one-shot legislative
bargaining game with closed rule.
Six, depending on the initial default policy and the identity of the agenda setter,
the policy outcome can be either full equality, full expropriation by the agenda setter,
partial expropriation, or policy inertia. That is, the amount of agenda setting power
depends on the session’s status quo policy. This is illustrated in the next set of
15examples.
EXAMPLE 3.2. Suppose that aT =1 . (A) Full equality.S u p p o s e t h a t xT−1 =
¡
w, 1
3G, 2
3G − w
¢
, where w ≤ 1
3G, then the equilibrium policy outcome is an egal-
itarian distribution of beneﬁts,
¡
1
3G, 1
3G, 1
3G
¢
. (B) Full expropriation.S u p p o s e t h a t
xT−1 =( w,0,G− w), then in equilibrium the policy outcome is (G,0,0) and the
agenda setter captures the entire beneﬁt. (C) Partial expropriation.S u p p o s e t h a t
G =6 0and xT−1 =( 5 ,30,25), then the equilibrium policy is (10,25,25). (D) Pol-
icy Inertia. Suppose that xT−1 =( G − 2w,w,w) for some w ∈
¡
1
3G, 1
2G
¤
. Then the
agenda setter is not able to change the policy at all.
Seven, in contrast to implications derived from legislative bargaining models in the
tradition of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), the agenda setter may not be one who receives
the most beneﬁt in equilibrium. Indeed, the agenda setter may be the legislator
who gets the least amount, as shown in Example 3.2 (C). This, however, happens
only if the agenda setter is suﬃciently disadvantaged by that session’s status quo.
This is consistent with episodes in which parties with insuﬃcent representation take
control of the government. Possible cases include minority and especially caretaker
governments.
Finally, the possibility to reconsider policy may create incentives for agenda-setters
to rationally make future proposals that will make him worse oﬀ than the current
proposal. In this case agenda setters would like to commit to making a proposal
only once. The possibility to reconsider policy at any time, however, rules out such
commitment. Note that, intuitively, commitment would amount to the credible belief
that certain policy areas will never be revisited. It is diﬃcult to see how this can be
accomplished in a constitutional fashion in a democracy.
3.2 The Penultimate Period
Since the status strongly impact the equilibrium in each session agents may have an
incentive to deviate from a strategy that would be optimal in order to strategically
position the status quo for the next and subsequent rounds. This holds, for example,
in the model of Kalandrakis (2003). Surprisingly, this is not the case in our model .So
16see why consider the penultimate period. Now the problem is that a policy choice in
period T −1 aﬀects not only a legislator’s instantaneous utility in that period but also
continuation value in period T through the moving status quo. However, we claim
that an agenda setter does not strategically manipulate the status quo. Instead, he
makes a policy proposal as if this was the last period.
The following captures the intuition for the formal argument.
Consider the case where the legislators bargain over the default policy for period
T before a new agenda setter is randomly selected. Suppose that legislator 1 is the
period-T − 1 agenda setter and he has to the power to make a proposal of a default
policy with the proposal being put to a vote against the current default, i.e. the policy
chosen in the previous period. A simple backward induction calculation shows that
in equilibrium the chosen initial default for period T gives the legislator 1 ab e n e ﬁto f
1
2G, some other legislator (say, legislator 2)a l s o1
2G, and the third legislator 0. This
default policy
¡
1
2G, 1
2G,0
¢
leaves both legislators 1 and 2 a unconstrained maximal
continuation value of 1
2G, and therefore once proposed, it would be supported by 1
and 2 in the majority voting.
Suppose then that in period T − 1 the initial default is
¡
1
6G, 1
3G, 1
2G
¢
and keep
in mind that legislator 1 is the agenda setter. Could he propose and pass a policy
of
¡
1
2G, 1
2G,0
¢
? Notice that this proposal gives legislator 1 his maximal continuation
value in the last period and higher current utility that what the default gives him.
However,
¡
1
2G, 1
2G,0
¢
will never be a policy outcome in period T − 1.T h i s h o l d s
b e c a u s eo n c eab i l lo f
¡
1
2G, 1
2G,0
¢
is passed, it also becomes the default for the rest
of the legislative session in T − 1. With probability δ, which is assumed to be close
to 1, the agenda setter gets a chance to revisit the policy and then would have a
strong incentive change the default policy. That is, with
¡
1
2G, 1
2G,0
¢
as the default,
legislator 1 as agenda setter would now propose a policy of (G,0,0), which would be
supported by legislator 3, and thus pass.Therefore the proposal of
¡
1
2G, 1
2G,0
¢
would
not be approved by voter 2.
More formally, if
¡
1
2G, 1
2G,0
¢
is the policy outcome in period T − 1, legislator 1
has a continuation value of 1
2G in the ﬁnal period. Therefore, in the last two periods
17legislator 1 receives a total utility of
¡
1
2G
¢
+ β
¡
1
2G
¢
=( 1+β)
¡
1
2G
¢
.
If (G,0,0) is the policy outcome in period T −1, legislator 1 has a continuation value
of 1
3G in the ﬁnal period. Therefore, in the last two periods legislator 1 receives a
total utility of
(1 − β)
£
G + β
¡
1
3G
¢¤
=( 1− β)
¡
1+1
3β
¢
G.
For any β ∈ [0,1), the policy (G,0,0) gives legislator 1 a larger total utility in the last
two periods. This implies that
¡
1
2G, 1
2G,0
¢
cannot be the ﬁnal policy outome in period
T − 1. Foreseeing that legislator 1 as agenda setter will not ﬁnalize the policy choice
at
¡
1
2G, 1
2G,0
¢
, legislator 2 will not accept this proposal. This eliminates strategic
manipulation of the status quo by any agenda setter for T. More generally, it is
straightforward to show that in period T −1 an agenda setter makes the same policy
proposal as in a one-sesseion game. Repeating this argument by backward inductions
yields the next proposition which is formally proved in the appendix.
Proposition 2 Suppose that T is ﬁnite. For any δ suﬃciently close to 1, there exists
a unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, in which for any t ∈ {1,...,T}, any
gt−1 ∈ ∆(G), and any a,l ∈ {1,2,3},
fl (g,a,t)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
min
i6=a
gi, if l 6= a,
1 − 2min
i6=a
gi, if l = a.
3.3 The Inﬁnite-Horizon Equilibrium
Again, we restrict our analysis to cases in which the agenda setter conditions his
proposal strategy only on the prevailing default. Consider an arbitrary round of ne-
gotiation in an arbitrary session with agenda setter a and default g. Let U∗
l (x,a) be
legislator l’s dynamic payoﬀ function with policy x. This corresponds to the expected
utility of legislator l if policy x is passed in this round of negotiation in the current
session. Let V ∗
l (x) be legislator l’s continuation value with a status quo policy x at
the beginning of the period before an agenda setter is randomly selected. Again we
18model voting by an incentive compatibility constraint and only explicity formulate
the proposal strategy of an agenda setter. Let g∗ : ∆(G) ×{ 1,2,3} → ∆(G) be the
policy rule. Given stationarity, we can drop the time variable from the functions.
We are now ready to deﬁne the equilibrium in the inﬁnite-horizon model.
Deﬁnition 2 A subgame perfect equilibrium of this political system with a ﬁnite hori-
zon is a set of dynamic payoﬀ functions (U∗
1,U∗
2,U∗
3), a set of continuation value
functions (V ∗
1 ,V∗
2 ,V∗
3 ), and a policy rule g∗, such that:
1. Given (U∗
1,U∗
2,U∗
3), g∗ solves the following maximization problem:
max
x0∈∆(G)
U∗
a (x0,a)
s.t. U∗
i (x0,a) ≥ U∗
i (d,a) for some i 6= a.
2. Given g∗ and V ∗
l , for all l ∈ {1,2,3},U ∗
l solves the following functional equa-
tion:
U
∗
l (x,a)=( 1− δ)[(1− β)xl + βV
∗
l (x)] + δU
∗
l (g
∗ (x,a),a).
3. Given g∗ and (U∗
1,U∗
2,U∗
3), for all l ∈ {1,2,3},V∗
l is deﬁned by equation
V
∗
l (x)=
P
at∈{1,2,3}
1
3U
∗
l (g
∗
l (x,a),a).
Condition 1 says that any agenda setter proposes a policy to maximize his own
dynamic payoﬀ subject to the constraint that this proposal can be approved by at
least one of the other legislators. Condition 2 deﬁnes dynamic payoﬀ functions. Due
to stationarity within a session, which here means that an agenda setter behaves in the
same way when facing identical defaults, this condition lays out a ﬁxed point problem
for the dynamic payoﬀ functions. The last condition states that continuation values
are expected dynamic payoﬀs in every period before an agenda setter is randomly
selected.
Similar to the ﬁnite-horizon game, the existence of a legislative equilibrium can
be easily established for any δ. However, for the purpose of the paper, we only
19characterize the equilibrium for δ suﬃciently close to 1. The next proposition presents
an inﬁnite-horizon equilibrium that is the limit of ﬁnite-horizon subgame perfect
equilibria as time horizon T goes to inﬁnity. In this equilibrium, an agenda setter
does not strategic manipulate the status quo and his strategy does not depend on
how the legislators negotiate over the policy in the past.
Proposition 3 Consider the inﬁnite horizon model. For any δ suﬃciently close to
1, there exists a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, in which for any x ∈ ∆(G),
and any a,l ∈ {1,2,3},
gl (x,a)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
min
i6=a
xi, if l 6= a,
G − 2min
i6=a
xi, if l = a.
Along this equilibrium path, policy dynamics in the long run depends on the initial
status quo policy x0 and identity of the ﬁrst agenda setter a1. If xa1,0 ≥ mini6=a1 xi,0 or
xa1,0 < mini6=a1 xi,0 ≤ 1
3, in any period, the agenda setter receives G − 2min i6=a1 xi,0,
and each of the other legislators receives mini6=a1 xi,0. If max
©
xa1,0, 1
3
ª
< mini6=a1 xi,0,
then until any i 6= a1 obtains power for the ﬁrst time, in every period a1 as agenda
setter gets G − 2min i6=a1 xi,0, which is strictly less than mini6=a1 xi,0, what each of the
other legislators obtains; after the ﬁrst time the initial agenda setter loses power,
in every period the agenda setter 4min i6=a1 xi,0 − G, which is strictly greather than
G − 2min i6=a1 xi,0, what each of the other legislators receives.
3.4 Discussion
First, as in the one-shot game in equilbrium each period agenda setters immediately
propose a new policy, even though the game form would allow him to propose new
policies as long as the period lasts. Without any uncertainty other than stochastic
turnover of power, the policy does not change as long as the agenda setter does not
change. With frequent possibilities of reconsideration, the equilibrium policy outcome
is substantially diﬀerent from a setup in which every agenda setter are constrained to
make a new policy only once as in, for example, the model of Kalandrakis (2004).
20Second, if an agenda setter holds power for consecutive periods, the policy is stable
over the consecutive periods; an agenda setter does not change the policy in his second
term. This is because both legislators without proposal power are given the same size
of beneﬁt and there is no room for the agenda setter to further expropriate any of them
in the second term. This result is in contrast to policy dynamics in some dynamic
legislative bargaining models, for example, Fong (2006) and Baron et al (2007). In
Kalandrakis (2004), during transitional periods when an agenda setter is not able to
expropriate all beneﬁts, he proposed diﬀerent policies and switched winning coalitions
from one period to the other when obtaining proposal power for two consecutive
periods. In other words, the respective models have competing implications on the
dynamics of policy choice that can be empirically investigated.
Third, note that the policy an agenda setter chooses in a multiperiod setup is
equal to what he would choose in a one-session setup. There is no manipulation of
the status quo by any agenda setter.
Fourth, the model implies very rich policy dynamics. Depending on the initial
status quo policy and the identity of the ﬁrst agenda setter, in the long run there are
three diﬀerent patterns of policy dynamics.
1. Full Expropriation by Any Agenda Setter
After ﬁnite periods of transition, whoever is the agenda setter takes all and leaves
nothing to the others. Illustrated by Example 4.1, such policy dynamics is reminiscent
of Kalandrakis (2004). However, in our model, full expropriation happens only if the
initial status quo is so unequal that some legislator originally gets nothing.
Example 4.1. G =6 0 ,g 0 =( 3 0 ,30,0)
time period ﬁrst second third fourth ...
agenda setter 33 1 2 ...
policy outcome (30,30,0) (30,30,0) (60,0,0) (0,60,0) ...
2. Inequality-Inclined Allocation of Beneﬁt
After ﬁnite periods of transition, in every period the agenda setter receives more
beneﬁts than the others, although he does not capture all. An agenda setter therefore
21has limited ability to expropriate the legislator excluded from his winning coalition.
The legislators without proposal power receive equal shares. This is illustrated by
Examples 4.2 and 4.3.
Example 4.2. G =6 0 ,g 0 =( 2 5 ,25,10)
time period ﬁrst second third fourth ...
agenda setter 3312 ...
policy outcome (25,25,10) (25,25,10) (40,10,10) (10,40,10) ...
Example 4.3. G =6 0 ,g 0 =( 3 0 ,20,10)
time period ﬁrst second third fourth ...
agenda setter 2312 ...
policy outcome (10,40,10) (10,10,40) (40,10,10) (10,40,10) ...
3. Full Egalitarian Distribution of Beneﬁts
The policy converges to a fully egalitarian distribution of beneﬁts right away, and
thereafter no agenda setter is able to change it anymore. All agenda setters, except
for the ﬁrst one, do not beneﬁt from being proposers. This is illustrated by Example
4.4.
Example 4.4. G =6 0 ,g 0 =( 3 0 ,20,10)
time period ﬁrst second third fourth ...
agenda setter 3212 ...
policy outcome (20,20,20) (20,20,20) (20,20,20) (20,20,20) ...
Finally, as shown in Examples 4.3 and 4.4 with the same initial status quo, policy
dynamics in the long run is path-dependent. In particular, it not only depends on
the initial status qup, but also who obtains power in the ﬁrst period. This model
thus suggests how political players in an early stage of democracy and the initial
distribution of beneﬁts may aﬀect the long-run pattern of ﬁscal policy.
224 Application: The Ratchet Eﬀect of Government
Spending
Next we investigate the model’s implications in the context of economic ﬂuctua-
tions. As we show below, the model’s equilibrium provides a possible explanation for
t h e" r a t c h e te ﬀect" of public spending in parliamentary democracies (Persson and
Tabellini 2004).
4.1 Stylized Facts and General Ideas
Recent empirical studies by Persson and Tabellini (2001, 2003, and 2004) showed that,
in parliamentary countries with proportional representation, government spending as
a fraction of GDP increases during cyclical downturns but does not come down during
cyclical upturns, whereas this "ratchet eﬀect" is not apparent in countries with other
constitutional arrangements. This section presents a simple political economy model
based on the analytical framework developed in Section 2 and shows how the legisla-
tive institutions typical of parliamentary democracies may lead to the asymmetric
movements of government spending.
Speciﬁcally, Persson and Tabellini divided democratic countries into four constitu-
tional groups, and empirically investigate how diﬀerent constitutional arrangements
shape ﬁscal policies. They show that proportional-parliamentary democracies diﬀer
from all other groups — majoritarian-presidential, majoritarian-parliamentary, and
proportional-presidential — in terms of ﬁscal policy dynamics.
First, government expenditure, ﬁscal deﬁcit and welfare spending are more per-
sistent in this group than in the others. Second, spending as a percentage of GDP
increases in cyclical down-turns but does not decrease in booms. In other words,
downturns lead to a lasting expansion of outlays and welfare spending in proportion
to GDP that is not reversed during upturns. Third, the diﬀerence in the size of gov-
ernment between this group and the others grew particularly large in the period up
to the early 1980s (or the early 1990s in the case of welfare spending).
23What could account for the special status of proportional-parliamentary democra-
cies? Proportional representation leads to minority parliaments; i.e. no party obtains
a majority of seats in parliament. This is true even if voters can vote strategically
(Baron and Diermeier 2001) and if governments can strategically manipulate future
status quos (Fong 2006, Baron, Diermeier, and Fong 2007). Therefore government
policy needs to be conceptualized as bargaining among multiple parties, either among
all parties represented in the parliament or among the parties represented in the gov-
erning coalition (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998). Note that this feature is absent in
all other constitutional groups. For example, parliamentary democracies with plural-
ity rule (e.g. the UK) usually lead to two major political parties. Except for the rare
case of a hung parliament, the party who controls a majority of seats usually has full
control over policy. One the other hand, presidential democracies (whether multi-
party or two-party) lack the constitutional feature of eﬀective agenda control by the
executive. So, our model combines the features typical of parliamentary democracies
(the government’s agenda control) with multi-party bargaining typical of proportional
representation. In the context of a simple model we show below how the friction re-
sulting from multilateral bargaining is the key to explaining the ratchet eﬀect.
The intuition is as follows. As discussed above a sizable fraction of total govern-
ment expenditure is related to continuing entitlement programs. In those programs
beneﬁts are distributed and once enacted, they are in eﬀect until they are reformed
in subsequent legislative sessions. When an economy is hit by a temporary nega-
tive income shock, the party that controls agenda setting faces a strong resistance
on expenditure cuts. This is because a more stringent entitlement program on any
socioeconomic group implies a worse status quo in the future and therefore a perma-
nently lower bargaining power of that group or party. Fiscal adjustment in response
t oat e m p o r a r ys h o c kh a sap e r m a n e n te ﬀect. This makes it extremely diﬃcult for an
agenda setter, whose power is persistent and may last for a certain amount of time,
to cut down expenditures on the other groups. On the other hand, with a tempo-
rary positive income shock, the leading party can easily satisfy its coalition partners
by their reservation values and pass a more generous entitlement program to beneﬁt
24the socioeconomic group it represents. An asymmetric, upward, movement of public
spending thus results.
4.2 A Simple Model: Impulse Response Analysis
In this section we present a dynamic model similar to that in Section 4 with one
important diﬀerence. Now the total size of beneﬁts, or the total government expendi-
ture, is endogenous. Imagine that every period the three legislators divide a pie but
the size of the pie is not ﬁxed. They have to jointly produce a total beneﬁto fG ∈ N
a n dt h e nd i v i d ei t .Ap o l i c yi st h e r e f o r eav e c t o r(x1,x 2,x 3,G), where G =
P3
l=1 xl.
Public production is costly and parties equally share the cost.3 T h ec o s tf u n c t i o n
depends on the state of the economy denoted by s. For simplicity, we assume that
the cost function is piecewise linear:
C (G,s)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
0, if G ≤ Gs,
(1 + c)
¡
G − Gs
¢
, if G>Gs,
for some c>0. Assume that s ∈ {H,N,L}, where H stands for high, N for normal,
and L for low. In good states, the marginal cost is smaller; In bad states, the marginal
cost is larger. Therefore we assume that GH > GN > GL. We do not explicitly model
income shocks. However, we conjecture that in this simple framework the eﬀect of a
negative public production shock should be similar to that of a negative income shock
in a fully speciﬁed public ﬁnance model.
The preference of legislator l is represented by
E
∙
∞ P
t=0
β
t ¡
xl,t − 1
3C (Gt,s t)
¢¸
,
where β ∈ [0,1) is a common discount factor as before.
As a normative benchmark, in the ﬁrst best solution, every period the total size of
government expenditure is equal to Gs; public spending is fully responsive to state of
the economy. In our model, the policy is chosen by the political process of legislative
bargaining. We want to show how the equilibrium policy deviates from the ﬁrst best
solution and identify a possible source of bargaining frictions.
3The model does not consider endogeous taxation or borrowing.
25Instead of fully characterizing this model with a general stochastic process that
governs transition of states, we conduct an impulse response experiment. We assume
that for every period, the state is stable and normal, but that in period 1, the economy
is hit by an unexpected temporary shock; s1 ∈ {H,L}. The exact interpretation
of this shock is not critical. What really matters is that the economy temporarily
deviates from its long-run trend; we now want to investigate how this ﬂuctuation
results in ﬂuctuation of government spending. Moreover, we assume that power is
persistent and legislator 1 is the agenda setter for every period. To obtain our result
we only require some degree of power persistence. That is, the party who will control
agenda setting in the next quarter is very likely to be the party currently in power.
In what follows, we divide the discussion into cases with a positive shock, s1 = H,
and a negative shock, s1 = H. We assume that the initial status quo policy is such
that the total spending G0 = GN and g2,0 ≥ g3,0.
Case I: A Temporary Positive Shock.
In period 1 with s1 = H, it is as if the agenda setter chooses a policy (x1,1,x 2,1,x 3,1,G 1) ∈
Z4
+ in order to maximize
(1 − β)
µ
x1,1 −
1
3
(1 + c)max
©
0,G 1 − GH
ª¶
+ β
¡
GN − 2x3,1
¢
,
subject to
x1,1 = G
1 − x2,1 − x3,1,
(1 − β)
¡
x3,1 − 1
3 (1 + c)max
©
0,G
1 − GH
ª¢
+ βx3,1 ≥ (1 − β)x3,0 + βx3,0,
and
(1 − β)
µ
x3,1 −
1
3
(1 + c)max
©
0,G 1 − GH
ª¶
+ βx3,1
=( 1 − β)
µ
x2,1 −
1
3
(1 + c)max
©
0,G 1 − GH
ª¶
+ βx2,1.
This equivalent maximization problem needs some explanation. Given any period-
one policy choice x1 =( x1,1,x 2,1,x 3,1), the continuation values of all three legislators
from the second period are GN − 2x3,1,x 3,1,x 3,1 respectively. The ﬁrst constraint
is the resource constraint (or balanced budget constraint). According to what we
26learned from Sections 2 to 4, the agenda setter makes a policy proposal that satisﬁes
one of the other legislators with the lowest reservation value. In our example, this
is legislator 3 and this explains the second constraint. Finally, in order for legislator
3 to accept the proposal, it has to be the case that legislator 2 does not receive a
lower utility level than him. Otherwise, in the rest of the session in period 1, the
agenda setter would revisit the policy and propose another policy that seeks support
from legislator 2. The last constraint summarizes this equal-utility property, which
is equivalent to the constraint that x2,1 = x3,1.
In equilibrium, (A) x2,t = x3,t =m i n {x2,0,x 3,0} for all t, (B) G1 = GH and
Gt = GN for all t>1, and (C) x1,1 = GH − 2min{x2,0,x 3,0} and g1,t = GN −
2min{x2,0,x 3,0}.
With a temporary positive shock, total expenditure expands accordingly, and all
extra spending goes to the party that controls the agenda. The legislators without
power do not beneﬁt from the positive shock. After the shock, total spending is back
to its normal level.
Case II: A Temporary Negative Shock.
In period 1 with s1 = L, it is as if the agenda setter chooses a policy (x1,1,x 2,1,x 3,1,G 1) ∈
Z4
+ in order to maximize
(1 − β)
¡
g1,1 − 1
3 (1 + c)max
©
0,G 1 − GL
ª¢
+ β
¡
GN − 2x3,1
¢
,
subject to
x1,1 = G1 − x2,1 − x3,1,
(1 − β)
£
x3,1 − 1
3 (1 + c)max
©
0,G 1 − GL
ª¤
+βx3,1 ≥ (1 − β)
£
x3,0 − 1
3 (1 + c)
¡
GN − GL
¢¤
+βx3,0,
and
(1 − β)
¡
x3,1 − 1
3 (1 + c)max
©
0,G 1 − GL
ª¢
+ βx3,1
=( 1 − β)
¡
x2,1 − 1
3 (1 + c)max
©
0,G 1 − GL
ª¢
+ βx2,1.
The second constraint guarantees that legislator 3, the "cheaper" possible coalition
partner, is indiﬀerent to the new period-1 policy. The last constraint requires that
27legislator 2, the one excluded from the winning coalition, is oﬀered the same total
utility as legislator 3. This is equivalent to the constraint that x2,1 = x3,1. Combining
the last two conditions we have
x2,1 = x3,1 = b x ≡ x3,0 + 1
3 (1 − β)(1+c)max
©
0,G 1 − GN
ª
.
Substituting the binding constraints, the agenda setter’s objective function is simpli-
ﬁed to
(1 − β)
©
G1 − 2
£
x3,0 − 1
3 (1 − β)(1+c)max
©
0,G 1 − GN
ª¤
− 1
3 (1 + c)max
©
0,G 1 − GL
ªª
+β
©
GN − 2
£
x3,0 − 1
3 (1 − β)(1+c)max
©
0,G 1 − GN
ª¤ª
.
There is only one unknown G1 in the objective function. It can be veriﬁed that every
G1 >G N makes the agenda setter worse oﬀ than G1 = GN, so the equilibrium period-
1 total spending must be no greater than GN. Moreover, G1 ≥ GL. Given these, the
objective function is simpliﬁed to
−(1 − β)cG 1 + constant.
Therefore, the agenda setter chooses G1 as small as possible given that that G1 ≥ GL
and the incentive constraints for legislator 3 to accept the policy.
In equilibrium, if 2b g ≤ GL, i.e., GL is suﬃciently large, we have G1 = GL. In this
case, x2,1 = x3,1 = b x and x1,1 = GL − 2b g. If the negative shock is not too bad, total
spending is fully adjusted downward to its socially optimal level. The spending on
the legislators without power are only slightly cut down. With reasonable parameter
values, x2,1 and x3,1 are very close to min{x2,0,x 3,0}. Most of the ﬁscal adjustment
is done by cutting the spending that beneﬁts the agenda setter.
In equilibrium, if 2b g>GL, i.e., GL is suﬃciently small, we have G1 =2 b g>GL.
In this case, x2,1 = x3,1 = b x and x1,1 =0 . Now, if the negative shock is very severe,
total spending cannot be fully adjusted downward to its socially optimal level. There
is overspending in the bad state. The spending on the legislators without power
are only slightly cut down, whereas the spending on the agenda setter is totally cut
down to zero. The fact that the agenda setter is receiving zero beneﬁti np e r i o d
281 should not be interpreted literally. If the agenda setter’s marginal utility of his
beneﬁt becomes suﬃciently large as spending on him is cut, in equilibrium, x1,1 may
be strictly positive even if the bad shock is very severe.
This simple model with an impulse analysis yields various testable empirical im-
plications. Importantly it generates a version of the ratchet eﬀect of total spending.
As the economy is hit by an unexpected temporary positive shock, the total spending
expands and all extra spending beneﬁts the agenda setter. As the economy is hit
by an unexpected temporary negative shock, the total spending may not be fully
downward adjusted. Whether it does depends on the size of the negative shock. The
intuition is that the agenda setter has diﬃculty cutting spending on the other legis-
lators; he can mainly cut down his own beneﬁt. If the negative shock is small, the
agenda setter is able to do so and adjust total spending to its new socially optimal
value. However, if the negative shock is suﬃciently large, the agenda setter leaves
zero beneﬁt to himself and at this corner solution, he is not able to further reduce
public spending. As a consequence, there is overspending compared to the ﬁrst best
solution.
Our model also raises some new empirical questions. First, in the empirical studies
Persson and Tabellini identify the ratchet eﬀect in parliamentary democracies with
proportional representation. Our intuition suggests that what matters is the form of
governance that makes ﬁscal policy decisions, here whether or not the ﬁscal policy is
a bargaining outcome by multiple parties with a sole agenda setter in each legislative
session. To test this tuition, we could possibly look at ﬁscal policy dynamics in those
countries during diﬀerent regimes: regimes with a majority party, and regimes with
a minority parliament and coalition governments. We conjecture that the ratchet
eﬀect is more prevalent when ﬁscal policy is determined by a coalition government.
Second, ratchet eﬀects are particularly pronounced for large negative shocks. Third,
it is worth analyzing the composition of government spending. In particular, over the
business cycles, how does spending on diﬀerent items ﬂuctuate? Our model implies
that in a bad state, the agenda setter’s spending is cut down the most. Whether
these predictions are observed in the data is an open question.
295 Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes a new analytical framework of legislative bargaining. The setup,
we believe, captures important features of legislative decision-making such as endoge-
nous defaulty, the possibility of reconsideration without a well-deﬁned last round of
decision-making and persistent agenda setting power. The model is tractable and can
be easily applied to dynamic models where it can a positive analysis of ﬁscal policy.
An immediate next step of this research agenda is to extend the core model to
include an arbitrary number of legislators with any decision rule and fully charac-
terize all legislative equilibria. We think the same intuitions carry over to a more
general context, including the key insight that an agenda setter has limited ability
to expropriate legislators excluded from the winning coalition if he holds the power
to reconsider the policy issue at some later dates. It also would be interesting to
investigate how the value of agenda setting and distribution of beneﬁts are aﬀected
by the size of the legislature and voting rules.
Another important extension of the core model is to replace the agenda setter
by a gatekeeper. We deﬁne a gatekeeper as the legislator who is conferred the veto
r i g h tt ob l o c ka n yp o l i c yp r o p o s a lm a d eb ys o m eo t h e r sa n da tt h es a m et i m ea b l et o
propose a new policy in some situations. The sequence of events in the game can be
modiﬁe da sf o l l o w s :T h e r ei sa ni n i t i a ld e f a u l t and one legislator is randomly assigned
to be a gatekeeper. The legislators then are able to make policy proposals in turn.
A legislator can choose to pass his turn if proposing a policy does not make himself
better oﬀ. Once a proposal is made, it has to be approved by the gatekeeper and
then voted on against the default by majority rule. A passed proposal becomes the
new default in future rounds of negotiation. Legislative interaction ceases after all
legislators pass. The ﬁnal default policy is implemented. In a model like this, we
would be able to compare the respective value of proposal and veto power.
Finally, this analytical framework could be incorporated into fuller developed mod-
els of public ﬁnance and macroeconomic policy choice. As recent empirical studies on
political economy and comparative constitutions have established more stylized facts
30and raise new questions about how political institutions shape dynamics of policy, we
expect fruitful insights from such an approach.
31Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove the proposition by induction on T.B y
Diermeier and Fong (2007), this proposition is true for the last period. Suppose that
the proposition is true for all of the last n periods, where n ∈ N and 1 ≤ n ≤ T − 1.
We want to show that the proposition is also true for period T − n.
We prove the proposition for period T −n by a standard technique of "conjecture
and veriﬁcation", and break the argument into three steps. We ﬁrst construct the
continuation value functions by the proved equilibrium policy rules in all subsequent
periods and conjecture the equilibrium policy rule in the current period. Given this
conjecture, we then construct dynamic payoﬀ functions that satisfy the functional
equations. Finally, we show that the conjectured policy rule solves the maximization
problem with all the constructed dynamic payoﬀ functions. We use a hat to denote
any function that is either conjectured or constructed based on conjecture.
Step 1. Calculating continuation value functions.
Without loss of generality, take any x ∈ ∆(G) such that x1 ≥ x2 ≥ x3. The
patterns of continuation value functions depend on the relative size of x2. Consider
the two cases below.
CASE 1. x2 ≤ 1
3G.
In period T −n+1, legislator 1 as agenda setter would propose (G − 2x3,x 3,x 3),
legislator 2 as agenda setter would propose (x3,G− 2x3,x 3), and legislator 3 as
agenda setter would propose (x2,x 2,G− 2x2). The expected per period utility of
legislator 1 or 2 in period T − n +1is therefore,
1
3 [(G − 2x3)+x3 + x2]=1
3 (1 − β)(G + x2 − x3),
and that of legislator 3 is
1
3 [x3 + x3 +( G − 2x2)] = 1
3 (1 − β)[G − 2(x2 − x3)].
In period T − n +2 , the status quo could be a permutation of (G − 2x3,x 3,x 3) or
(x2,x 2,G− 2x2). Since x3 ≤ x2 ≤ 1
3G, we have x2 ≤ G − 2x2 and x3 ≤ G − 2x3.
If any permutation of (G − 2x3,x 3,x 3), according to the new equilibrium policy,
32any legislator as agenda setter gets G − 2x3, and each of the other legislators gets
x3. The expected per period utility of any legislator is therefore 1
3G. Similarly, If
any permutation of (x2,x 2,G− 2x2), according to the new equilibrium policy, any
legislator as agenda setter gets G−2x2, and each of the other legislators gets x2. The
expected per period utility of any legislator is there 1
3G. It is then straightforward to
establish that in all subsequent periods, if any, the expected per period utility of any
legislator equals 1
3G. Given this, we calculate the continuation value of any legislator
in the beginning of period T − n +1(or at the end of period T − n) as follows:
b V1 (x,T− n)=b V2 (x,T− n)
= 1
3 (1 − β)(G + x2 − x3)+
n−1 P
τ=1
β
τ (1 − β)
¡
1
3G
¢
=( 1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢
+ 1
3 (1 − β)(x2 − x3),
and
b V3 (x,T− n)=1
3 (1 − β)[G − 2(x2 − x3)] +
n−1 P
τ=1
β
τ (1 − β)
¡
1
3G
¢
=( 1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢
− 2
3 (1 − β)(x2 − x3)
CASE 2. x2 > 1
3G.
Again, the expected per period utility of legislator 1 or 2 in period T − n +1
is 1
3 (G + x2 − x3), and that of legislator 3 is 1
3 [G − 2(x2 − x3)]. The expected per
period utilities in all subsequent periods, however, depend on the realized sequence
of agenda setters. In period T − n +2 , the status quo could be a permutation of
(G − 2x3,x 3,x 3) or (x2,x 2,G− 2x2). Since x3 =m i n i∈{1,2,3} xi, we have x3 ≤ G−2x3.
However, since x2 > 1
2G, we have x2 <G−2x2. If either legislator 1 or 2 is the agenda
setter in period T −n+1so that the period T −n+2status quo is a permutation of
(G − 2x3,x 3,x 3), according to the new equilibrium policy, any legislator as agenda
setter gets G−2x3, a n de a c ho ft h eo t h e rl e g i s l a t o r sg e t sx3. The expected per period
utility of any legislator is therefore 1
3G. However, if legislator 3 is the agenda setter in
period T −n+1so that the period T −n+2status quo is (x2,x 2,G− 2x2), legislator
1 or 2 as agenda setter would get G−2(G − 2x2)=4 x2−G and leave G−2x2 to each
of the others, whereas legislator 3 as agenda setter would not be able to change the
33policy. Therefore, the expected per period utility of legislator 1 or 2 is there x2 > 1
3G
and that of legislator 3 is G − 2x2 < 1
3G. It is then straightforward to establish the
fact that in all periods after period T −n+1, as long as legislator 3 keeps serving as
an agenda setter, the expected per period utility of legislator 1 or 2 is x2 and that of
legislator 3 is G − 2x2. Otherwise, the expected per period utility of any legislator is
1
3G. Given this, we calculate the continuation value of any legislator in the beginning
of period T − n +1(or at the end of period T − n)a sf o l l o w s :
V1 (x,T− n)=V2 (x,T− n)
= 1
3 (1 − β)(G + x2 − x3)+
n−1 P
τ=1
β
τ (1 − β)
£¡
1
3
¢τ x2 +
¡
1 −
¡
1
3
¢τ¢¡
1
3G
¢¤
=( 1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢
+ 1
3 (1 − β)(x2 − x3)+1
3β
¡
1 − β
n−2¢¡
x2 − 1
3G
¢
,
and
V3 (x,T− n)=1
3 (1 − β)[G − 2(x2 − x3)]
+
n−1 P
τ=1
β
τ (1 − β)
£¡
1
3
¢τ (G − 2x2)+
¡
1 −
¡
1
3
¢τ¢¡
1
3G
¢¤
=( 1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢
− 2
3 ((1 − β)x2 − x3) − 2
3β
¡
1 − β
n−2¢¡
x2 − 1
3G
¢
.
Step 2. Conjecturing a policy rule.
We guess that for any x ∈ ∆(G) and any a ∈ {1,2,3},
b gl (x,a,T− n)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
min
i6=a
xi, if l 6= a,
G − 2min
i6=a
xi, if l = a.
Observe that by this conjecture, for any x ∈ ∆(G) and any x ∈ {1,2,3},
b g(b g(x,a,T− n),a,T− n)=b g(x,a,T− n). (4)
This implies that if this is an equilibrium policy rule, in equilibrium, there is at most
one round of negotiation in any period. Any incentive compatible policy proposal is
stable in a way that the agenda setter would not want to change it anymore should
there be chances of reconsideration in the rest of the session.
Step 3. Constructing dynamic payoﬀ functions over equilibrium policy
outcomes.
34Take any x ∈ ∆(G) and any a ∈ {1,2,3}. By equations (2) and (4),
b Ul (b g(x,a,T− n),a,T− n)=( 1 − δ)
h
(1 − β)b gl (x,a,T− n)+βb Vl (x,T− n)
i
+δb Ul (b g(b g(x,a,T− n),a,T− n),a,t)
=( 1 − δ)
h
(1 − β)b gl (x,a,T− n)+βb Vl (x,T− n)
i
+δb Ul (b g(x,a,T− n),a,t),
which implies that
b Ul (b g(x,a,T− n),a,T− n)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
(1 − β)min
i6=a
xi + βb Vl (x,T− n), if l 6= a,
(1 − β)
µ
G − 2min
i6=a
xi
¶
+ βb Vl (x,T− n), if l = a.
Step 4. Constructing dynamic payoﬀ functions over all policy alternatives.
Without loss of generality, take any x ∈ ∆(G) such that x1 ≥ x2 ≥ x3. The pat-
terns of dynamic payoﬀ functions depend on the relative size of x2 as the continuation
value functions do in Step 1. We discuss the two cases below.
CASE 1. x2 ≤ 1
3G.
For any l ∈ {1,2}, if a 6= l, then
b Ul (x,a,T− n)=( 1 − δ)
h
(1 − β)xl + βb Vl (x,T− n)
i
+ δb Ul (b g(x,a,T− n),a,T− n)
=( 1 − δ)
h
(1 − β)xl + βb Vl (x,T− n)
i
+δ
∙
(1 − β)min
i6=a
xi + βb Vl (b g(x,a,T− n),T− n)
¸
=( 1 − δ)
©
(1 − β)xl + β
£
(1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢
+ 1
3 (1 − β)(x2 − x3)
¤ª
+δ
∙
(1 − β)min
i6=a
xi + β (1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢¸
;
if a = l, with a similar calculation as above, then
b Ul (x,l,T− n)=( 1 − δ)
©
(1 − β)xl + β
£
(1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢
+ 1
3 (1 − β)(x2 − x3)
¤ª
+δ
∙
(1 − β)
µ
G − 2min
i6=a
xi
¶
+ β (1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢¸
.
Consider the dynamic payoﬀ function for legislator 3. If a 6=3 , then
b U3 (x,a,T− n)=( 1 − δ)
©
(1 − β)xl + β
£
(1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢
− 2
3 (1 − β)(x2 − x3)
¤ª
+δ
∙
(1 − β)min
i6=a
xi + β (1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢¸
;
35if a =3 ,t h e n
b U3 (x,3,T− n)=( 1 − δ)
©
(1 − β)xl + β
£
(1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢
− 2
3 (1 − β)(x2 − x3)
¤ª
+δ
∙
(1 − β)
µ
G − 2min
i6=a
xi
¶
+ β (1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢¸
.
CASE 2. x2 > 1
3G.
For any l ∈ {1,2}, if a 6= l, then
b Ul (x,a,T− n)=( 1 − δ)(1− β)
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
xl + β
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎣
µ
1−(
1
3β)
n
1−1
3β
¶¡
1
3G
¢
+ 1
3 (x2 − x3)
+1
3β
µ
1−(
1
3β)
n−2
1−1
3β
¶¡
x2 − 1
3G
¢
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎭
+δ
∙
(1 − β)min
i6=a
xi + β (1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢¸
;
if a = l, then
b Ul (x,l,T− n)=( 1 − δ)(1− β)
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
xl + β
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎣
µ
1−(
1
3β)
n
1−1
3β
¶¡
1
3G
¢
+ 1
3 (x2 − x3)
+1
3β
µ
1−(
1
3β)
n−2
1−1
3β
¶¡
x2 − 1
3G
¢
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎭
+δ
∙
(1 − β)
µ
G − 2min
i6=a
xi
¶
+ β (1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢¸
.
Finally consider the dynamic payoﬀ function for legislator 3. If a 6=3 , then
b U3 (x,a,T− n)=( 1 − δ)(1− β)
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
xl + β
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎣
µ
1−(
1
3β)
n
1−1
3β
¶¡
1
3G
¢
− 2
3 (x2 − x3)
−2
3β
µ
1−(
1
3β)
n−2
1−1
3β
¶¡
x2 − 1
3G
¢
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎭
+δ
∙
(1 − β)min
i6=a
xi + β (1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢¸
;
if a =3 , then
b U3 (x,3,T− n)=( 1 − δ)(1− β)
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
xl + β
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎣
µ
1−(
1
3β)
n
1−1
3β
¶¡
1
3G
¢
− 2
3 (x2 − x3)
−2
3β
µ
1−(
1
3β)
n−2
1−1
3β
¶¡
x2 − 1
3G
¢
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎭
+δ
∙
(1 − β)
µ
G − 2min
i6=a
xi
¶
+ β (1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢¸
.
Step 5. Verifying optimality of the conjectured policy rule.
36To complete the ﬁxed-point problem for period T − n, we have to verify that
given the constructed dynamic payoﬀ functions, the policy rule maximizes an agenda
setter’s dynamic payoﬀ, subject to the constraint that it would be approved by at least
one of the other legislators. Here, the approval constraint imposed by the legislators
without proposal power is crucial in shaping the policy outcome. Without loss of
generality let a =1and take any x ∈ ∆(G) such that x2 ≥ x3. Let g∗ ∈ ∆(G) be a
policy that solves
max
x0∈∆(G)
b Ua (x0,a,T− n)
s.t. b Ui (x0,a,T− n) ≥ b Ui (x,a,T− n) for some i 6= a.
We want to show that g∗ = b g(x,a,T− n). We prove this by a series of claims. In the
claims especially note where and how the assumptions of a suﬃciently large δ plays
a role. Some claims below without proofs are obvious ones.
CLAIM 1. For any δ suﬃciently close to 1,
min
i6=1
g
∗
i (x,a,T− n) ≥ min
i6=1
xi.
PROOF OF CLAIM 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that g∗
j (x,1,T− n) < mini6=1 xi
for some j 6=1 . With probability δ, after this current round of negotiation the session
continues and the agenda setter gets another chance to make a policy proposal. The
total discounted and expected utility of any legislator i 6=1derived from this subgame
is
(1 − β)min
i6=1
g
∗
i (x,1,T− n)+β (1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢
,
which is strictly smaller than the total discounted and expected utility derived from
the subgame in which the current default x remains, that is
(1 − β)min
i6=1
xi + β (1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢
.
For all δ suﬃciently close to 1, this implies that
b Ui (g
∗ (x,1,T− n),1,T− n) < b Ui (x,1,T− n)
for any i 6=1 , which is a contradiction.
37CLAIM 2. For distinct j,k 6=1 , if b Uj (g(x,1,T− n),1,T− n) ≥ b Uj (x,1,T− n),
then g∗
k (x,1,T− n) ≤ g∗
j (x,1,T− n).
PROOF OF CLAIM 2. We prove it by contradiction. Suppose that g∗
k (x,1,T− n) >
g∗
j (x,1,T− n) and consider e g ∈ ∆(G) such that e g1 = g1 (x,1,T− n)+1and
e gk = g∗
k (x,1,T− n)−1. Following the dynamic payoﬀ functions constructed in Step
4, we can show that
b Uj (e g,1,T− n)=b Uj (g
∗ (x,1,T− n),1,T− n) ≥ b Uj (x,1,T− n),
and
b U1 (e g,1,T− n) > b U1 (g
∗ (x,1,T− n),1,T− n),
which is a contradiction. To do the above comparison, we have to discuss the following
six cases: Case 1: g∗
1 (x,1,T− n) ≤ g∗
j (x,1,T− n) ≤ 1
3G. Case 2: g∗
1 (x,1,T− n) ≤
g∗
j (x,1,T− n) and g∗
j (x,1,T− n) > 1
3G. Case 3: g∗
j (x,1,T− n) <g ∗
1 (x,1,T− n) ≤
g∗
k (x,1,T− n) and g∗
1 (x,1,T− n) ≤ 1
3G. Case 4: g∗
j (x,1,T− n) <g ∗
1 (x,1,T− n) ≤
g∗
k (x,1,T− n) and g∗
1 (x,1,T− n) > 1
3G. Case 5: g∗
1 (x,1,T− n) >g ∗
k (x,1,T− n)
and g∗
k (x,1,T− n) ≤ 1
3G. Case 6: and g∗
1 (x,1,T− n) >g ∗
k (x,1,T− n) > 1
3G. The
calculation is trivial.
CLAIM 3. For distinct j,k 6=1 , if b Uj (g(x,1,T− n),1,T− n) ≥ b Uj (x,1,T− n),
then g∗
k (x,1,T− n)=g∗
j (x,1,T− n).
PROOF OF CLAIM 3. We prove it by contradiction. Suppose, to the contrary,
that g∗
k (x,1,T− n) <g ∗
j (x,1,T− n). Note that, by the construction in Step 3,
b Ul (x,1,T− n) can be expressed by the summation of
(1 − δ)Φ(x,T− n)
and
δ
£
(1 − β)g
∗
k (x,1,T− n)+β (1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢¤
,
where Φ(x,T− n) is shorthand of the complete expression of function. If
Φ(x,T− n) > (1 − β)g
∗
k (x,1,T− n)+β (1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢
,
38then it must be the case that g∗
k (x,1,T− n) ≥ mini6=1 xi +1 , and if
Φ(x,T− n) ≤ (1 − β)g
∗
k (x,1,T− n)+β (1 − β
n)
¡
1
3G
¢
,
then it must be the case that g∗
k (x,1,T− n) ≥ mini6=1 xi, so that b Uj (g∗ (x,1,T− n),a,T− n) ≥
b Uj (x,1,T− n) as δ is suﬃciently close to 1. Consider e g ∈ ∆(G) such that e g1 =
g∗
1 (x,1,T− n)+1and e gj = gj (x,1,T− n) − 1. It is straightforward to verify that
b Uj (e g,1,T− n) ≥ b Uj (x,1,T− n),
for all δ suﬃciently close to 1 and
b U1 (e g,1,T− n) > b U1 (g
∗ (x,1,T− n),1,T− n),
which is a contradiction.
CLAIM 4. Consider any g ∈ ∆(G) such that gj = gk = g for any j,k 6=1and for
some g ∈ N. Then b U1 (g,1,T− n) is decreasing in g.
B yC l a i m s1t o4 ,w eh a v es h o w nt h a tap o l i c yb g ∈ ∆(G), such that b g1 = G −
mini6=1 xi and b gj =m i n i6=1 xi for any j 6=1 , is the policy that maximizes b U1 (·,1,T− n)
subject to the constraint that it is approved by at least one of the other legislators.
Thus far we have proved the optimality of the conjectured policy rule b g(x,a,T− n)
and therefore completed the ﬁxed-point problem in period T − n.
Proof of Proposition 3. Initially we conjecture that the policy rule is as given in
the proposition. Then following Steps 1, 3, and 4 in the proof of Proposition 2, we can
construct the following continuation value functions and dynamic payoﬀ functions:
For any x ∈ ∆(G) such that x1 ≥ x2 ≥ x3,
V
∗
1 (x)=V
∗
2 (x)=1
3G + 1
3 (1 − β)(x2 − x3)+1
3β
¡
x2 − 1
3G
¢
,
V
∗
3 (x)=1
3G − 2
3 (1 − β)(x2 − x3) − 2
3β
¡
x2 − 1
3G
¢
;
for any l ∈ {1,2}, if x2 ≤ 1
3G and a 6= l, then
b Ul (x,a)=( 1 − δ)
©
(1 − β)xl + β
£
1
3G + 1
3 (1 − β)(x2 − x3)
¤ª
+δ
∙
(1 − β)min
i6=a
xi + β
¡
1
3G
¢¸
;
39if x2 ≤ 1
3G and a = l, then
b Ul (x,l)=( 1 − δ)
©
(1 − β)xl + β
£
1
3G + 1
3 (1 − β)(x2 − x3)
¤ª
+δ
∙
(1 − β)
µ
G − 2min
i6=a
xi
¶
+ β
¡
1
3G
¢¸
;
if x2 ≤ 1
3G and a 6=3 , then
b U3 (x,a)=( 1 − δ)
©
(1 − β)xl + β
£
1
3G − 2
3 (1 − β)(x2 − x3)
¤ª
+δ
∙
(1 − β)min
i6=a
xi + β
¡
1
3G
¢¸
;
if x2 ≤ 1
3G and a =3 ,t h e n
b U3 (x,3) = (1 − δ)
©
(1 − β)xl + β
£¡
1
3G
¢
− 2
3 (1 − β)(x2 − x3)
¤ª
+δ
∙
(1 − β)
µ
G − 2min
i6=a
xi
¶
+ β
¡
1
3G
¢¸
;
if x2 > 1
3G, l ∈ {1,2} and a 6= l, then
b Ul (x,a)=( 1 − δ)(1− β)
n
xl + β
h³
3
3−β
´¡
1
3G
¢
+ 1
3 (x2 − x3)+1
3β
³
3
3−β
´¡
x2 − 1
3G
¢io
+δ
∙
(1 − β)min
i6=a
xi + β
¡
1
3G
¢¸
;
if x2 > 1
3G, l ∈ {1,2} and a = l, then
b Ul (x,l)=( 1 − δ)(1− β)
n
xl + β
h³
3
3−β
´¡
1
3G
¢
+ 1
3 (x2 − x3)+1
3β
³
3
3−β
´¡
x2 − 1
3G
¢io
+δ
∙
(1 − β)
µ
G − 2min
i6=a
xi
¶
+ β
¡
1
3G
¢¸
;
if x2 > 1
3G, l =3and a 6= l, then
b U3 (x,a,)=( 1 − δ)(1− β)
n
xl + β
h³
3
3−β
´¡
1
3G
¢
− 2
3 (x2 − x3) − 2
3β
³
3
3−β
´¡
x2 − 1
3G
¢io
+δ
∙
(1 − β)min
i6=a
xi + β
¡
1
3G
¢¸
;
if x2 > 1
3G, l = a =3 , then
b U3 (x,3) = (1 − δ)(1− β)
n
xl + β
h³
3
3−β
´¡
1
3G
¢
− 2
3 (x2 − x3) − 2
3β
³
3
3−β
´¡
x2 − 1
3G
¢io
+δ
∙
(1 − β)
µ
G − 2min
i6=a
xi
¶
+ β
¡
1
3G
¢¸
.
Following the procedure in Step 5 in proof of Proposition 2, we can show the
optimality of the policy rule.
40References
[1] Aghion, P. and P. Bolton. 1990. "Government domestic debt and the risk of a
default: A political-economic model of a strategic role of debt." In R. Bornbusc-
hand.Draghi, eds., Public Debt Management: Theory and History.
[2] Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik. 1994. "Distributive politics and economic growth."
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
[3] Alesina, A., N. Roubini and G. Cohen. 1997. Political Cycles and the Macroecon-
omy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
[4] Alesina, A. and G.Tabellini. 1990. "A positive theory of ﬁscal deﬁcits and gov-
ernment debt." Review of Economic Studies.
[5] Azzimonti, M. 2006. "On the Dynamic Ineﬃciency of Governments," Mimeo.
[6] Banks, J.S. (1985). “Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control,” Social
Choice and Welfare 1: 295-306
[7] Baron, David P. 1996. “A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Pro-
grams.”American Political Science Review, 90 (June): 316-330.
[8] Baron, David P.; Diermeier, Daniel and Fong, Pohan (2007). “Policy Dynamics
and Ineﬃciency in a ParliamentaryDemocracy with Proportional Representa-
tion”. Working Paper. Stanford University.
[9] Baron, David P. and Ferejohn, J. 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American
Political Science Review, 83: 1181-1206.
[10] Baron, David P. and Michael Herron. 2003. “A Dynamic Model of Multidimen-
sional Collective Choice.”In Computational Models of Political Economy,K e n
Kollman, John H. Miller, and Scott E. Page, ed., MIT Press, pp. 13-47.
[11] Baron, David P. and Daniel Diermeier. 2001. “Elections, Governments, and
Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems.”Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics. (August): 933-967.
41[12] Battaglini, Marco and Stephen Coate. 2005. “Ineﬃciency in Legislative Policy-
Making: A Dynamic Analysis.”Working paper, Princeton University.
[13] Battaglini, Marco and Stephen Coate. 2006. “A Dynamic Theory of Public
Spending, Taxation and Debt.”Working paper, Princeton University.
[14] Bernheim, Douglas, Antonio Rangel, and Luis Rayo. 2006. “The Power of the
Last Word in Legislative Policy Making.”Econometrica 74: 1161-1190.
[15] Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. 1998. “Sources of Ineﬃciency in a Repre-
sentative Democracy.”American Economic Review 88: 139-156.
[16] Diermeier, Daniel and Feddersen, Timothy (1998). “Cohesion in Legislatures
and the Vote of Conﬁdence Procedure,“ American Political Science Review 92:
611-21.
[17] Diermeier, Daniel and Pohan Fong. 2007. "Dynamic Bargaining in Legislatures,"
Mimeo.
[18] Doering, Herbert. 1995. “Time as a Scarce Resource. Government Control of the
Agenda.” In Doering, Herbert, ed. Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western
Europe. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
[19] Duggan, John and Kalandrakis, Tasos (2007). “A Dynamic Model of Legislative
Bargaining”. Working paper. University of Rochester.
[20] Fong, Pohan. 2006. "Dynamics of Government and Policy Choice," Mimeo.
[21] Hassler, J., J. Mora, K. Storesletten and F. Zilibotti. 2003. "The survival of the
welfare state," American Economic Review.
[22] Kalandrakis, Anastassios. 2004. “A Three-Player Dynamic Majoritarian Bar-
gaining Game.”Journal of Economic Theory. 16: 294-322.
[23] Knight, Brian (2005). “Estimating the Value of Proposal Power,” The American
Economic Review, 95-5: 1639-1652.
42[24] Krusell, P., and V.-J. Rios-Rull. 1996. "Vested interests in a positive theory of
stagnation and growth." Review of Economic Studies.
[25] Lizzeri, Alessandro and Persico, Nicola, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods
under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, March
2001, 91: 225-239.
[26] McKelvey, R. 1976. "Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and
Some Implications for Agenda Control," Journal of Economic Theory, 12: 472-
482.
[27] Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., R. Perotti, and M. Rostagno. 2002. "Electoral Systems
and Public Spending." Quarterly Journal of Economics.
[28] Pagano, M. P. F. Volpin. 2006. "The political economy of corporate governance,"
American Economic Review.
[29] Penn, Elizabeth Maggie. 2005. “A Model of Farsighted Voting.”Working paper,
Harvard University.
[30] Persson, T. and L. Svensson. 1989. "Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run
aD e ﬁcit: Policy with Time-inconsistency Preferences," Quarterly Journal of
Economics.
[31] Persson, T. and G. Tabellini. 1994. "Is inequality harmful for growth?" American
Economic Review.
[32] Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido (1999). “The Size and Scope of Gov-
ernment: Comparative Politics With Rational Politicians,” European Economic
Review 43: 699-735.
[33] Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini. 2000. "Comparative Politics and Public
Finance," Journal of Political Economy
[34] Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido. 2001. “Political Institutions and Policy
Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts?” Banca D’Italia Working Paper #412.
43[35] Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2003. The Economic Eﬀects of Constitu-
tions. The Munich Lectures in Economics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[36] Persson, T. and G. Tabellini. 2004. "Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Out-
comes," American Economic Review.
[37] Rogoﬀ. K. 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic
Review 80:21-36.
[38] Riboni, Allesandro. 2005. “Committees as Substitutes for Commit-
ment.”Working paper, Universite de Montreal.
[39] Shepsle, K. and Weingast, B. 1984. "Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting
with Implications for Agenda Institutions." American Journal of Political Sci-
ence. 28:49-74.
44